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THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT BY CONFESSION ON PROMISSORY NOTES
It is the purpose of this article to state the general
principles governing the entry of judgment by confession
on promissory notes with some practical suggestions as to
the manner of entry. The article contains only a general
statement of the law and is intended to give students a
working knowledge of the subject, rather than to be of
any particular assistance to active practicioners.

I-TYPES OF NOTES
(a) Non-Negotiable
The simplest and most used form of promissory note
of this character is:
$1000.00
Harrisburg, Pa., March 15, 1928
Three months
after date
I
promise to
pay to the order of
John Doe
One Thousand
($1000.00) 00/100
Dollars
Without defalcation, value received, with interest.
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And further-I- do hereby empower any Attorney of any Court
of Record within the United States or elsewhere to appear for-meand after one or more declarations filed, confess judgment against
-me--as of any term for the above sum with costs of suit, Attorney's commission of-l0--per cent for collection and release of
all errors, and without stay of execution, and inquisition and extension upon any levy on real estate is hereby waived, and condemnation
agreed to and the exemption of personal property from levy and sale
on any execution hereon, is also hereby expressly waived, and no
benefit of exemption law now in force or which may be hereafter
passed.
Witness-my hand and seal.

-Richard

Roe-(Seal)

It is apparent that the first part of the example is the
ordinary promissory note, and the second part is an authority to any attorney of any court of record to appear
and confess judgment for the um named in the promissory
note. Under the decisions of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, this note could be entered and judgment confessed
on it at any time after it was delivered to the payee. If the
note in the illustration were delivered on the 13th of March
to the payee, judgment could be entered on that date, although the note might be dated March 15 and payable
June 15, Volkenand v. Drumm, 143 Pa. 525.
In Integrity Insurance Company v. Rau, 153 Pa. 488,
where the warrant of attorney permitted judgment to be
confessed as of any term, the Court said:
"There is no condition, limitation, or restriction of any
kind either as to the time of the judgment to be entered,
or its amount, within the penal sum of the bond. If default
should take place in the payment of the last 'note judgment
might be entered for the whole forty-eight hundred dollars,
although only one hundred would be due. So judgment
might be entered at once before any of the notes was due.
The bond is, in terms, for immediate payment, though its
subsequent provisions show that it is only to be collected
upon a default on the notes; and the authority to confess
judgment is immediate; though execution cannot issue until
default. The condition, that in case of nonpayment of any
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one of the notes, all those remaining unpaid shall become
immediately due and payable, is not, as appellee argues, a
restriction on the right of the obligee to enter judgment,
but a stipulation in his favor, by which his right to issue
execution on the whole is advanced and matured upon a
default of payment of any of the parts."

It has always been the legal construction of such notes
that the confession of judgment is presumptively collateral
security to receive the debt payable in the future, unless
there is something on the face of the note to show it is to
be used only at a later time: Pacific Lumber Co. v. Rodd,
287 Pa. 454; O'Maley v. Pugliese, 272 Pa. 357; Shapiro v.
Malarkey, 278 Pa. 78.
By virtue of the very fact that judgment can be
entered on the note in this illustration before maturity, it
is not negotiable. In Milton National Bank v. Beaver, 25
Superior 494, it was decided that under the Negotiable Instruments Act of May 16, 1901, section 5, P. L. 194, a provision in a promissory note authorizing a confession of
judgment before matlirity made the note non-negotiable.
The same principle was stated in Hoverter v. Consedine, 82
Superior 294. Whether the note is negotiable or not may
have an important bearing on the manner of its entry. If
negotiable, title to it passes by endorsement under the
Negotiable Instruments Act. The payee or any subsequent
holder can enter the note in his own name as plaintiff. But
if the note is non-negotiable, title passes only by assignment. The assignee must enter the note to the use in the
following manner:
(Assignor,) now for the use of (Assignee),
V.

(Maker)
unless the assignment is made under hand and seal before
two or more credible witnesses in compliance with section 8
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of the Act of May 28, 1715, 1 Smith Laws 90, in which event
suit can be brought by the assignee in his own name under
section 3 of the Act. Complications under the Act of 1715
should be avoided, Philadelphia v. Lockhardt, 73 Pa. 211.
It has been decided that a note similar to the one in
the illustration shows on its face the amount due so that
a judgment can be entered on the note without the intervention of an attorney. The judgment can be for the entire
amount of the note, or for the balance, if credits are noted:
Morel v. Morel, 81 Super. 84. In Pennsylvania, we have
the act of February 24, 1806, 4 Smith Laws 278, which provides:
"Section XXVIII.

And be it further enacted by the

authority aforesaid, that it shall be the duty of the prothonotary of any court of record, within this Commonwealth,
on the application of any person being the original holder
(or assignee of such holder) of a note, bond, or other instrument of writing, in which judgment is confessed, or
containing a warrant for an attorney at law, or other person
to confess judgment, to enter judgment against the person
or persons, who executed the saihe for the amount, which,
from the face of the instrument, may appear to be due,
without the agency of an attorney, or declaration filed,
with such stay of execution as may be therein mentioned,
for the fee of one dollar, to be paid by the defendant; particularly entering on his docket the date and tenor of the
instrument of writing, on which the judgment may be
founded, which shall have the same force and effect, as if a
declaration had been filed, and judgment confessed by an
attorney, or judgment obtained in open court, and in term
time; and the defendant shall not be compelled to pay any
costs, or fee to the plaintiff's attorney, when judgment is
entered on any instrument of writing as aforesaid."

This Act was passed by the General Assembly to enable
laymen to have judgment entered on such promissory notes
without retaining and paying an attorney at law a fee for
so doing. This Act of 1806 was not intended to change the
long existing practice of the entry of judgments by con-
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fession by means of an amicable action (which will be discussed later).
In Hageman v. Salisberry, 74 Pa. 280, Judge Mercur
said:
"The judgment by the prothonotary under a power con-

tained in the instrument is a judicial act, and may be
entered by him under the Act of 1806, or may be confessed
by an attorney independently of that Act."
To the same effect are Cook v. Gilbert, 8 S. & R. 567, and
McAlmont v. Peters, 13 S. & R. 196.
Any person, therefore, having a note similar to the one
in this illustration, may take it to the prothonotary of the
court of Common Pleas of the county in which he desires
to have judgment entered and hand the prothonotary the
note plus a small entry fee charged by the prothonotary.
This fee is fixed by Act of Assembly according to the
size of the county. The prothonotary then enters judgment on his appearance docket and makes the proper entry
in the judgment index. It must be remembered that in 1806
there were no intermediate courts like the present municipal court of Philadelphia, and so the clerk of the municipal
court cannot enter a judgment on this kind of note under
the Act of 1806, because he is not, strictly speaking, a prothonotary: Jameson Piano Co. v. Ernest, 66 Superior 586.
In the municipal court, a judgment can only be entered by
confession by means of an amicable action, unless the note
authorizes any prothonotary, or clerk, or attorney of any
court of record to confess judgment, Auto Transit Co. v.
Koch (No. 1), 71 Superior 171.
On the other hand, if a client gives a note of the character set out in this illustration to an attorney, the latter
generally writes on the back of the note, "John Smith, attorney", or "John Smith, attorney for John Doe" (assuming that the payee is the client). If the attorney is a careful practicioner, he will write the following on the back of
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the note or on a separate praecipe to which the note is
attached:

John Doe
V.

Richard Roe

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin
County
No ------- May Term, 1928
Real Debt $1000.00

Interest from (whenever due)
Atty's comm. 10%
Inq. and Ex. Waived

Enter judgment on the within note (or attached note)
in the above manner and form.
John Smith
Attorney for John Doe
To: Prothonotary,
Harrisburg, Pa.
Any of the methods outlined accomplish the same purpose.
The prothonotary is still the one who exercises the
warrant of attorney under the Act of 1806, or, as has been
more accurately described, the prothonotary exercises the
authority given in the note, Cook v. Gilbert, supra. All
that the lawyer has done is to have the note entered on his
order or praecipe. This means that his name is to appear
on the appearance docket as attorney for plaintiff, which
guarantees him that the judgment cannot be satisfied without his signature and that, when it is satisfied, he will receive in addition to any attorney's commission named in
the note, the statutory attorney fee of $3.00, Act of Apriil
2, 1868, P. L. 3, section 9, providing the judgment is over
$100.00. Act of May 5, 1876, P. L. 112, section 1. The last
suggested method is valuable because the attorney makes
sure that the judgment is entered in the correct name of
the defendant against whose property it is important that
a lien be secured. With a poorly written signature on a
note, the prothonotary who is rushed with work can easily
make a mistake that might cost the client dearly and in
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addition, the attorney is sure that dates, amounts, names,
parties, and all other formalities are correct, because the
prothonotary will always follow a praecipe of this kind.
There are attorneys who go to the trouble to enter
all notes by amicable action, whether they are notes which
could be entered by the prothonotary, by virtue of the Act
of 1806, or not. Such a practice is unnecessary and is a
waste of time and energy.
(b) Negotiable
Another form of note and one now in increasing use
with banks and trust companies, reads much like the note
in the first illustration, except that the confession, instead
of beginning with the language, "and further I do hereby
empower any attorney, etc.", reads: "and if this note is
not paid at maturity, I do hereby empower, etc." This type
of note specifically provides, on its face, that judgment can
be entered only after maturity. It is therefore negotiable,
Green v. Dick, 72 Super. 266. A prothonotary will not receive such a note for entry before the due date named on
its face. However, if a note of this character should slip
by the eagle eye of the prothonotary and a judgment be
entered on it before it is due, the judgment is good but is
voidable at the instance of the defendant, Osterhout v.
Briggs, 37 Superior 169. In case the defendant should
object to the entry of the judgment before maturity and
move to have the judgment stricken off, and the court
should strike off the same (which it unquestionably will) a
second judgment cannot be entered by confession after
maturity of the note, because the action of the plaintiff in
causing the first judgment to be entered, was a complete
execution of the power conferred by the warrant of attorney. Once the warrant of attorney has been exercised,
it is dead and cannot be used or exercised a second time,
even though the first exercise thereof was irregular and
void, Bellevue v. Hallett, 234 Pa. 191; Philadelphia v. Johnson, 23 Superior 591, affirmed in 208 Pa. 645. However, if
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the defendant does not object, third parties cannot move
to strike off the judgment, Osterhout v. Briggs, supra,
except where there is fraud or collusion, Hanika's Estate,
138 Pa. 330. It is well to remember the two methods of attacking a judgment that were stated by Judge Sharswood
in O'Hara v. Baum, 82 Pa. 416 on 420:
"A motion to set aside or strike off a judgment must be
on the ground of irregularity appearing on the face of the

record; a motion to open it is an appeal to the equitable
power of the court to let the defendant into a defence."

Strictly speaking, therefore, if a note of this kind is entered
before its maturity, the defendant may move to strike
it off, but creditors must move to open it on the ground of
fraud or collusion.
(c) Installment Notes
The third type of note (which is being extensively used
by automobile finance companies) provides for the payment
of a certain sum in regular installments, and, if default be
made in the payment of any installment, judgment is confessed for- the unpaid balance. No two companies have exactly the same form of note, although the principle behind
most of them is the same. The problem raised by these
notes is whether the amount due can be ascertained by the
prothonotary from the face of the note, or whether it requires an amicable action for the entry of judgment. In
Whitney v. Hopkins, 135 Pa. 246, the confession was as
follows;
"And further the said party of the second part, in case
default be made, for the space of three months in all or any
of the above payments, does hereby confess judgment to the
said party of the first part, his heirs or assigns, for the
whole amount unpaid on the above agreement, with interest
and costs, etc."

Several credits were written on the back of the paper containing the confession of judgment. It was contended that
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the prothonotary had no authority to enter judgment and
that he would have to look outside the instrument to ascertain a fact upon which the right to enter judgment depended. The court decided that the instrument was within
the Act of 1806 and that upon its face it was practicable
for the prothonotary to determine the existence of a default and the amount due the holder. The court said:
"The possession of an instrument in writing for the
payment of money affords proof, prima facie, of a right in
the holder to recover upon it according to its terms. The
holder is not required to prove that it has not been paid.
His case is made by the production of the instrument in the
first instance, and the burden of showing payment is on
him who alleges it. Whether the instrument be a note,
a bond or a contract, like that on which this judgment was
entered, the rules of evidence are the same. The instrument
makes for the holder a case, prima facie, on which he
could recover before a jury, or have a judgment entered by
virtue of the power of attorney. Both the default and the
amount due were ascertainable in the first instance from the
face of the instrument. If payments had been made that did
not appear on the paper, so that there was in fact no default,
the court would on application hear the defendant's proofs,
-but, until the prima facies of the instrument is overcome
by proof, the judgment must stand."

The following illustrates a typical installment note:
$1000
Harrisburg
Pa.
March 15, 1928
(Total of Note)
(City)
(State)
(Date)
AFTER DATE, I, WE, OR EITHER OF US, PROMISE TO
PAY TO-John Doe-, OR ORDER, IN-10-EQUAL MONTHLY
INSTALLMENTS OF-$100--EACH THE FIRST PAYABLE ONE
MONTH AFTER DATE,-One
thousand DOLLARS,
with interest from maturity at the highest lawful rate.
And if allowed by law, 15 per cent of the principal and interest
of this note as attorney's fees, if placed in the hands of an attorney
for collection, and authority, irrevocably to any attorney-at-law to
appear for me/us in any court, and waive the issue and service of
process and confess a judgment against me/us in favor of the holder
hereof, either severally or jointly with any endorsers hereof, for such
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aniount as may appear to be unpaid hereon after maturity together
with costs and attorney's fees, and to release all errors and waive all
right of appeal. Value received without relief under any exemption
or insolvency law. Upon non-payment of any installment at its
maturity all remaining installments shall become immediately due and
payable.

NEGOTIABLE AND PAYABLE AT THE OFFFICE OF THE X COMPANY AT HARRISBURG, WITH EXCHANGE ON HARRISBURG.

-Richard

Roe-

This note, under the decision in Whitney v. Hopkins, supra,
could also be entered by the prothonotary under the Act of
1806. Some interesting installment notes were before our
Pennsylvania Courts in: Dalton v. Willingmyre, 60 Superior
225; Wurlitzer Co. v. Pearson, (No. 1), 62 Superior 425;
Union Co. v. Grant Co., 5 D. & C. 407; National Cash Reg.
Co. v. Keystone Co., 3 D. & C. 24; International Syndicate
v. Quaker Mills, 8 D. & C. 23.

Sometimes these notes contain a confession not only
for the debt, costs and attorney's commission, but include
other items, the amount of which cannot possibly be ascertained from the face of the note. In that event, the rule
stated by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Connay
v. Halstead, 73 Pa. 354, applies to prevent the prothonotary
from entering judgment under the Act of 1806. The judgment in Connay v. Halstead, supra, was confessed on an
agreement to pay a certain price per acre of land, but the
number of acres had to be ascertained by a survey which
had not been made at the time judgment was entered. The
Supreme Court struck off the judgment (even though the
survey and an affidavit of the plaintiff were filed after the
case was being heard), saying:
"This act (act of 1806) does not confer upon the prothonotary all the power of an attorney at law to confess a
judgment, but only authorizes him without the agency of
an attorney to enter a judgment in the way specified in the
act, to wit, for the amount which from the face of the instrument may appear to be due. This would probably em-
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brace a case where the sum due can be ascertained by calculation from the face of the writing, upon the maxim, id
certum est quod certum reddi potest. But in this case the
sum or amount due, could by no possible calculation be made
to appear from the face of the instrument. It was an agreement for the sale of a tract of land by loosely-stated boundaries and no quantity stated. The price was to be at the
rate of ten dollars an acre, and the number of acres was
to be ascertained by a survey. Until the number should
be thus determined, a matter wholly outside of the face of
the paper, the amount of the purchase money could not be
known. The prothonotary had no guide, therefore, in entering the judgment."

The situation often presents itself to an attorney
in which he is doubtful whether the amount due can be
ascertained from the face of the note. In such a case he
should prepare and file what has been called an amicable
action, because the power of an attorney to confess judgment by an amicable action is much greated than the power
of the prothonotary under the Act of 1806, Melnick v. Hamilton, 87 Superior 575. Any kind of note containing the
necessary confession can be entered by amicable action.
The Supreme Court in Hageman v. Salisberry, 74 Pa. 280,
stated all the essentials for an amicable action when it said:
"A declaration in the usual form was filed. An attorney
appeared for the defendant and executed a written confession of judgment. He therein declared that he did it
by virtue of a warrant of attorney authorizing him thereto.
In that confession, he recited substantially all the conditions
of the obligation. With it he filed the original bond, showing full authority for his act * * *"
"* * * in contemplation of law, a judgment on warrant of
attorney is as much an act of the court as if it were formally
pronounced on nil dicit or a cognovit, and till it is reversed
or set aside, it has all the qualities and effect of a judgment
on verdict * * * That the authority of an attorney is more
extensive in Pennsylvania than in other countries, and that
his act binds the client, is recognized by numerous cases."

The most important feature of the amicable action is
the appearance for the defendant and the exercise of the
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warrant of attorney by the attorney who appears for the
defendant. Without this, the judgment is a nullity, Lytle
v. Colts, 27 Pa. 193. This amicable action is really nothing
more than having the attorney for the plaintiff prepare the
pleadings on both sides of the case. It requires a statement
of claim, to which the original note must be attached, and
this statement of claim should be signed by the attorney
for the plaintiff. See Kirch v. Crawford, 61 Superior 288, for
complete form. There should be a definite statement of
how the various amounts claimed are ascertained, or there
should be an affidavit attached to it fully setting out these
facts. Some attorneys make the plaintiff's statement very
short and set out the facts in the affidavit, while others
make a very complete statement of claim and attach a short
affidavit that the facts set forth in the statement of claim
are true. The essential thing, however, is the appearance and
confession of judgment on the part of the defendant. This
is stated somewhat as follows:
State of Pennsylvania
SS:
County of Dauphin
By virtue of the power of attorney above recited (or
recited in the above captioned case) I do hereby appear
for the said defendant and confess judgment against him
and in favor of the said plaintiff for the sum of $1000.00,
and $100.00 attorney's commission, in all, $1100.00, with interest on the debt from the 15th day of June, A. D. 1928,
costs of suit, release of all errors, without stay of execution;
inquisition and extensions upon any levy of real estate are

hereby waived and condemnation agreed to, and the exemption of personal property from levy and sale on any
execution is also hereby expressly waived, and no benefit of
exemption shall be claimed under or by virtue of any exemption law now in force.
-John
SmithAug. 10, 1928

Attorney for Defendant

Harrisbrg, Pa.

This appearance for the defendant and exercise of his
warrant of attorney must comply exactly with the con-
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fession which the defendant has signed and cannot be
broader than that warrant. Ordinarily, the statement of
claim, the affidavit and the entry of the appearance and
confession for the defendant are all put under the same
backer and filed as one paper, and with it a praecipe to the
prothonotary to enter judgment upon the amicable action
and confession of judgment therewith filed. Sometimes
this amicable action is called taking judgment on a D.S.B.
(debitum, sine brevi,-debt without a Writ). The form
books should be consulted and actual cases examined at the
courthouse to see how this is accomplished, because every
county has its own peculiarities of practice.
(d) Other Forms of Notes and Endorsements
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Stewart v.
Stocker, 1 Watts 135, said:
"It is now settled in this state that a mortgage or
judgment may be given to secure a creditor not only for a
debt due but for responsibilities which are contingent, and
for future advances, Lisle v. Ducomb, 5 Binney 585."

In Holden v. Bull, 1 Penrose & Watts 460, a judgment
was confessed for the payment of a fine and bill of costs
which was uncertain in amount at the time of judgment.
The court decided that such a judgment was valid.
About the only qualification to this rule is that judgment may be confessed for an unascertained sum but must
be liquidated before execution, Holden v. Bull, supra.
This is on the same principle that rent can be confessed
on a lease for the entire balance of the term, under an acceleration clause, but execution can only be issued for the
rent earned, and as each month's rent becomes due a new
execution must issue, Shapiro v. Malarkey, 278 Pa. 78;
Pacific Lumber Co. v. Rodd, 287 Pa. 454.
A discussion of judgment notes would not be complete without reference to endorsements or assignments

204
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containing a confession of judgment. They are often found
in the following form (printed on the back of the note):
"For value received, the undersigned hereby unconditionally guarantees payment of the within note, in all its
terms, and waives presentment and demand for payment,
protest and notice of protest for non-payment, and consents
that extensions of time of payment may be granted the
maker without notice to, and without releasing the liability
of, the undersigned hereunder, and hereby irrevocably authorize any attorney-at-law to appear for the undersigned
in any court and waive the issue and service of process and
confess judgment against the undersigned in favor of the
holder hereof, either severally or jointly with the maker or
makers hereof for such amount as may appear to be unpaid

hereon after maturity, together with costs and attorney's
fees and release all errors and waive all right of appeal."
John Doe

And another form is:
"For value received, I hereby sell, assign, transfer, and
set over, the within note to the Miners State Bank and
guarantee payment of the same, and I empower any attorney of any court of record to confess judgment against
me for the amount together with 5% added for attorney's
commission, and hereby waive inquisition, exemption, and

stay of execution in judgment
Witness my hand and seal this 5th day of January,
A. D. 1920.
John Doe (Seal)."

(The last form was taken from Miners State Bank v.
Auksztokalnis, 283 Pa. 18).
In almost every case, in order to take Judgment on
these endorsements or assignments containing a confession
of judgment, it is necessary to do so by amicable action,
Automobile Corporation v. Duffy Motor Co., 85 Super. 296.
The question arises frequently as to whether a joint judgment can be taken against both the maker and the endorser
or assignor.
In Romberger v. Romberger, 290 Pa. 454, M. C. Romberger made a note payable to D. W. Romberger, who en-
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dorsed it to a bank. Both the note and the endorsement
contained confessions of judgment. The prothonotary entered one judgment against M. C. Romberger and D. W.
Romberger, jointly. The judgment was stricken off by the
court below and this action was affirmed by the Supreme
Court who said:
"The judgment was void on its face as there was no
right to enter a judgment against two individuals upon a
separate warrant of attorney executed by each. * * * furthermore, the liability of the defendants was several and
not joint, one being as maker and the other as endorser."

In a very interesting opinion in Agricultural Trust Co.
v. Brubaker, 73 Superior 468, the Superior Court under a
similar set of facts, declared that no judgment had been
entered against the endorser (who was the payee) and that
the judgment, which had been jointly entered, could be
amended to strike off the endorser's name. The decision
not only sustained the entry of the judgment but declared
that the warrant of the endorser had not been exercised, and
held a separate judgment entered later by the holder against
the endorser valid. Followed in Union Bank of Nanty-Glo
v. Schnable, 291 Pa. 228.
The decision in the Romberger case is the general rule
in Pennsylvania, Blatt Co. v. McCarthy, 54 Superior 463;
Pasco v. Roland, 88 Superior 245; Eddy v. Smiley, 26 Superior 318.
II-STATUTES AND RULES OF COURT
AFFECTING ENTRY
1. Act of May 28, 1715, 1 Sm. L. 90, sec. 8:
This has been previously discussed and provides that
assignment of notes shall be under seal with two witnesses,
in which case assignee can sue in his own name. Without
these formalities, assignee must enter the judgment to his
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use, Harris v. Berry, 7 C. C. 239; Tritt's Adm. v. Colwell's
Adm., 31 Pa. 228 on 233.
2. Act of Feb. 24, 1806, 4 Sm. L. 278:
This is the Act giving the prothonotary power to enter
judgment by confession, where the amount due can be
ascertained from the face of the instrument.
3. Act of May 26, 1897, P. L. 94:
This Act permits the owner of several notes, against
the same person or persons, due at the same time, to enter
a single judgment on them (and thus save costs), Shafer v.
Hamill, 67 Pitts. Legl. J1. 395.
4. Act of March 31, 1915, P. L. 39:
This Act provides that the prothonotary shall not enter
judgment unless there is produced to him a certificate
signed by the creditor or his agent, setting forth the residence of the creditor and directing such certificate to be
filed at the same term and number as the judgment.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania struck off the
judgment in Deibert v. Rhodes, 91 Superior, 23, because
such a certificate was not filed with the judgment note, but
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 291 Pa. 550 reversed
the decision of the Superior Court and reinstated the judgment, because the plaintiff, when he took the note to the
prothonotary for entry, stated his address and the prothonotary endorsed on the back of the note: "Plaintiff's residence is Allentown, Pa., No. 1505 Liberty Street," and when
the judgment was entered of record it read, "Whereupon
the same day, judgment is entered for the plaintiff and
against the defendant for $500.00 by Jackson Rhodes, Prothonotary. Plaintiff's residence is 1505 Liberty Street,
Allentown, Pa."
The decision of the Superior Court was based on the
idea that the Act of 1915 was a limitation on the power
given the prothonotary under the Act of 1806 and that therefore: "The authority of the prothonotary to enter the judgment being statutory, and the Act of 1915, imposing limita-
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tions upon the exercise of the power, the officer was without authority to enter the judgment when the plaintiff
failed to comply with the provisions of the later statute."
The Supreme Court declared the sole object of the
Act of 1915 was to affordreliable record information to the
taxing authorities (such judgments being taxable). "The
essence of the thing to be accomplished by this statute is
the placing upon record, with the judgment, the precise
residence address of the plaintiff, and this may well be
treated as mandatory; while the exact manner in which it
shall appear may be regarded as a matter of form and construed as directory."
The decision does not remove the requirements of the
Act of 1915, but merely decides that substantial compliance
took place under the facts. These certificates should be
prepared and filed every time a note is presented for entry.
5. Act of Congress of 1918 (March 8) 40 Stat. at L. 440
(Comp. Stat. Supp. 1919 Sec. 3078ybb):
This Federal Statute requires proof by affidavit that
defendant was not in military service at time judgment was
taken. It only applies to judgments taken by default where
adverse process has issued and not to judgments by confession, Racunas v. Vaughan, 29 Dist. Rep. 1058.
6. Rules of Court:
I. Where Note is More Than 10 Years Old and Less than 20:
In practically every county in this state there is a rule
of court requiring (where the warrant to be entered is over
10 years and under 20 years old) a motion for leave to enter
judgment accompanied by an affidavit of the due execution
of the warrant, that the money is unpaid, and the party
executing the instrument or those against whom it is proposed to enter judgment is or are living.
The purpose of such a rule is to overcome the apparent
laches in entering judgment and to satisfy the court that
the signature to the note is genuine; that it is a valid and
subsisting obligation and that the maker is living, Keiber
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v. Keiber, 90 Superior 116. If the rule is violated, the
plaintiff can amend nunc pro tunc, but any executions issued on it before amendment will be set aside in favor of
intervening execution creditors, Woods v. Woods, 126 Pa.
396.
II. Where Note is More Than 20 Years Old:
This rule of court generally requires (where the warrant to be entered is over 20 years old) a rule to show
cause, based on affidavit. The rule must be served upon
the party personally, if within the state, and if without the
state by three weeks advertisement in the legal publication
of the respective county.
The purpose of the rule is to rebut the presumption of
payment arising from the lapse of time; as by showing a
demand of payment and acknowledgement of the debt,
Keiber v. Keiber, 90 Superior 116. The rule issued is not to
determine the exact amount due on the note but to show
why judgment should not be entered upon it. "If on the
rule, a prima facie case is made out in favor of the note,
judgment should be entered-thus securing the plaintiff his
lien on the defendant's real estate-leaving any substantial
dispute as to the precise amount due to be settled by a rule
to open, Hotchkiss v. Johnson, 13 Dist. 768 (Walling,
P. J.)"; Keiber v. Keiber, supra.
Before judgment can be taken on this rule by default
(if there is no appearance or answer) due proof of service
must be filed as provided by most rules of Court. Without
proper proof of service or attempt at service, the proceeding would be void, Bierly v. Hamor, 50 Super. 124.
III. Actual Warrant Must Be Filed
In a few counties there is a peculiar rule of court which
reads: "In all cases where judgment is confessed by warrant of attorney, the warrant and the instrument upon
which the judgment is confessed, or true copies thereof,
verified by affidavit, shall be filed at the time judgment is
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entered." It was held in Weiskircher v. Fisher, 28 District
Rep. 455, that such a rule prevented a confession of judgmen by an attorney on an oral power of attorney.
The decisions appear to be confusing on this proposition. In Flanigen v. Phila. 51 Pa. 491, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania said: "It has never been understood to be
the law of the state that the authority of an attorney must
be in writing to enable him to confess a judgment. It is daily
practice to confess judgment withotit special warrant". In
Hageman v. Salisberry, 74 Pa. 280, the same court said:
"Where he (the attorney) appears without authority and
confesses 'judgment, the remedy is against him, or in a
proper case the court in which it was entered may open
the judgment". In Bauer v. Rihs, 4 District 583, the court
allowed judgment to be entered upon a copy of the note,
after proof that the original was lost.
On the other hand, in Maloney v. White, 24 C. C. 23,
it was held that the prothonotary could not enter judgment
on a copy, saying:
"Under no circumstances is he (the prothonotary) justified in giving judgment upon what purports to be merely a
copy, as was done in this case. * * * it is true the plaintiff in
a contest could be compelled to produce the original or have
the judgment vacated, but what adequate protection does
this afford against forgery or fraud. * * * as to the necessity
for filing the confession, it is said in Fraley's Appeal, 76
Pa. 42, 'The practice of delivering a note or bond upon
which judgment is entered by the prothonotary under the
Act of 1806 back to the plaintiff is bad and malus usus
abolendus est. It should remain on file as the evidence of
authority for the judgment and the protection of the defendant.' Even in the case of judgment confessed by an
attorney by virtue of a warrant of attorney for that purpose, the warrant should be filed, Banning v. Taylor, 24 Pa.
289; Chambers v. Denie, 2 Pa. 421."

As a rule of thumb, the writer is safe in saying that
good practice would require the actual warrant of attorney
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to be filed and left with the prothonotary either in an
amicable action or under the Act of 1806. It is only in
actions begun by adverse process that warrants of attorneys are seldom in writing or filed, Banning v. Taylor,
24 Pa. 289.
IV. Amicable Actions
Some courts require the filing of a specific statement of
the cause of action where the judgment is confessed in an
amicable suit. This rule usually carries the following or a
similar proviso:
"It being understood that this rule does not apply to
judgments, or warrants of attorney, confessions of judgment, or written powers to confess judgment, or to revivals
of judgment by agreement."
Such a rule is really unnecessary but is worth remembering in case a note is entered by amicable action. The
statement can be filed nunc pro tunc if the rights of no
other parties have intervened, Fox v. Boorse, 81 Superior
211. It has no reference to entry by prothonotary under
Act of 1806, Dunham v. Kelly, 8 D. & C. 25.
V. Preliminary Rule to Show Cause
In a few counties in Pennsylvania, there recently existed a rule of court providing that no judgment should be
entered by the prothonotary (in amicable actions) without
a previous rule to show cause and order of court. Such a
rule is void and need not be complied with, Equipment
Corp. of America v. Primos Vanadium Co. 285 Pa. 432.
Ill-THE NOTE ITSELF
It need not be under seal, Cook v. Gilbert, 8 S. & R. 567.
It requires neither attestation nor acknowledgement, Caldwell v. Walters, 18 Pa. 86. Maker's signature need not be
witnessed, McAlmont v. Peters, 13 S. & R. 196. But it
must be remembered that the Act of March 21, 1806, 4 Sm.
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Laws 330, see. 8, 1 Purdon p. 245, sec. 45, not the one mentioned before, does require two witnesses. This Act permits two persons to become parties to an amicable action
without an attorney, and to have the prothonotary confess
a judgment on such action. (It is never used because
amicable actions are now prepared by attorneys.) The
holder of the note can fill in the blank spaces left for pronouns and the amount of attorney's commission before filing
the note, Saudners v. Baldwin, 9 District Rep. 552. But
the note can be entered without the blanks being filled in,
Heilig's Est., 18 Montgomery Co. Law Rep. 91; Sweesey v.
Kitchen, 80 Pa. 160. The payee's name can be filled in
Wolfgang v. Shirley, 51 Super. 65. If the amount of attorney's commission is left blank, none can be entered as
a part of the judgment, and hence none can be collected,
Mahoning Co. Bank's Appeal, 32 Pa. 158; McAllister's Appeal, 59 Pa. 204. The holder can fill in the amount of the
note, if that is not stated, Int. Adv. Co. v. Quaker Mills, 8
D. & C. 23. Even though the note reads "After one or more
declarations filed, confess etc." the prothonotary can enter
a judgment under the Act of 1806, without a declaration or
affidavit, Montelius v. Montelius, Brightley 79; Rex v.
Nelson, 15 Phila. 323; Union Acceptance Co. v. Grant Co.
5 D. & C. 407; Melavage v. Akelaites, 8 D. & C. 111; Spiese
v. Shee,.250 Pa. 399.
An attorney's commission can not be collected unless
execution is issued. If defendant pays at maturity, the
right to it is gone, Moore's Appeal, 110 Pa. 433.
The word "confess" need not be used in the warrant,
nor need it be to an attorney at law as it ordinarily is. "I
authorize any attorney or prothonotary to enter judgment
against me for etc." was held sufficient in Cooper v.
Shaver, 101 Pa. 547. But the warrant should be to some
one, or to a class of persons, designated by name or description, Sarriel v. Davis, 77 Pitts Leg. J1. 217.
"A warrant to confess judgment contains, not only a
grant of the authority expressed clearly and intelligibly,
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but a designation, by name or description, of the person
who is to execute it", Rabe v. Heslip, 4 Pa. 139. Yet it
has been held that the words "confess judgment" are
enough, James v. Crownover, 3 Sadler, 73; Burgunder v.
Lederer, 12 C. C. 222; Ely v. Karmany, 23 Pa. 314. The
release of errors, found in most notes, operates only upon
irregularities in the proceeding apparent on the record. It
does not reach the defect of lack of authority to confess the
judgment, Pitts. Coal Co., v. Potts, 92 Superior 1; Phila. v.
Johnson, 23 Superior 591; affirmed in 208 Pa. 645. As was
said in Curry v. Bacharach Shops, 271 Pa. 364, such waiver
and release is not a waiver of the right to have inquiry
made into the power of the lessor to enter the judgment
at all.
The words "in any court of record" are generally found
in such notes. In Oberlin v. Parry, 287 Pa. 224, a note
was executed and made payable in Tennessee, and did not
mention Pennsylvania. The jurisdiction of the Philadelphia
County courts was attacked on this ground. The Supreme
Court said that a judgment of this nature is valid in a state
whose procedure authorized it, though it might be contrary
to the laws of the State where it is sought to be enforced
(citing Grover Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U. S.287); that the presumption, without evidence to the contrary, is that the
law of the state, where the note was made, is the same
as that in Pennsylvania; and finally that when the instrument was presented to the prothonotary in Philadelphia
it must be assumed, in the absence of evidence, that it came
from a state which authorized entry of judgment there in
the same manner that the prothonotary was called on to
enter it here under our laws.
If the words "after default" are used, an amicable
action, specifically averring default, is necessary, Kolf v.
Lieberman, 282 Pa. 479.
RICHARD HENRY KLEIN,
Sunbury, Penna.,
Member Of Northumberland County Bar
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MOOT COURT
CASSEL v. HOME INSURANCE COMPANY
Insurance-Two Year Incontestable Clause in Policy Fraud Ascertained in that Period-Tender Back of Premiums
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant insurance company issued a policy to the husband
of plaintiff in which she was beneficiary on January 1st, 1920. The
policy contained the following clause, "This policy shall be incon-

testable after two years from its date of issue, except for non payment of premiums." Learning January 1, 1921, of false representations made in securing the policy, the company tendered the premiums paid with a notice that they rescinded the contract. The insured
refused to accept and before the next premium date died. After
demand, the plaintiff, sues on January 1, 1923 for the amount of the
policy.

Dreher, for plaintiff.
Sommer, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
(Mrs.) Irvine, J. The question to be decided in this case is was
the tender back of the premiums, with a notice that defendant rescinded the contract, sufficient to relieve defendant of liability.
A review of the cases as to what constitutes a recission of a contract of insurance are not in accord, but in Pennsylvania, the leading
cases hold, that notice to either party of a cancellation and a tender
back of the premiums by the insurer is all that is necessary, when
cancellation is desired within the contestable period and cancellation
is without fraud.
In Home Mutual Life Association of Penna. v. Riel, 1 Mon. (Pa.)
615, the Court holds-"To effect a recission the company must return
or tender back the premiums paid by insured."
In Feirman v. Eureka Life Insurance Co., 279 Pa. 507, Mr.
Justice Kephart states: "The great weight of authority supports
the position that the insurer must at least disavow liability within the
contestable period to be relieved-not necessarily legal action, but
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some definite steps, specifying the ground of complaint, in such
form as to effect a cancellation of the contract. The incontestable
clause means precisely what its language states; the policy will not
be challenged, opposed or litigated and is indisputable after two
years. Prior to this period, the company may contest it for any
sufficient reason. The knowledge that false representations have
been made must be ascertained within two years, and in the same
period, the company, by some act, must rescind, cancel or notify
the insured that it will no longer be bound by the policy."
In Gorski v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 88 Pa. Superior 326, the Court states: "The knowledge that false representations have been made must be ascertained within the two years, and
in the same time, the company, by some act must rescind, cancel or
notify the insured that it will no longer be bound by the policy."
See also Suravitz v. Prudential Life Insurance Co., 261 Pa. 390.
Feinberg v. New York Life Insurance Co., 256 Pa. 61.
As counsel for the defendant states, "An insurance policy is a
contract, and like any other contract may be rescinded for fraud.
Such recission may be affected by a tender back by the defrauded
party of what he has received, and a demand for a return of what
the wrong doer has received."
If it were necessary that suit be commenced in local courts to
effect a cancellation of a policy of insurance, it would tend to crowd
said courts with a multiplicity of suits, which courts of equity and
law seek to avoid.
Therefore, in view of the facts set forth and the decisions of the
cases quoted, a contract of insurance, in which appears a two year.
incontestable clause, and within that period false statements and
fraud is ascertained on the part of the insured, the company may
rescind its contract and tender back the premium paid-and not
necessarily by legal action.
The Court therefore finds in favor of the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
There is no binding precedent in Pennsylvania as to what constitutes a sufficient contest under the incontestable clause of an
insurance policy. Both Feirman v. Eureka Life Ins. Co., 279 Pa. 507
and Gorski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 88 Super. 326 are persuasive
merely. The opinions there given were mere obiter dicta. In the
first case nothing was done within the period allowed, and in the
second case an offer to return the premiums in the giving to the
insured of a release of all liability on the policy was held not a sufficient contest.
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But both courts intimate, and common sense dictates, that such
a provision should receive a reasonable construction. If the insured
is unequivocally notified that the company rescinds and will return
the premiums paid, he can ask no more. He knows that the company
refuses to recognize the policy as existing and can take any legal steps
necessary to protect his interests. To hold that some legal action
must be started is to strain the natural meaning of the words and to
encourage unnecessary litigation.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

EARLY v. FRUIT CORPORATION
"more or less--Quantity Necessary
Fraud-Intentional Shortage

Sales-Bulk-Phrase

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At an auction, the plaintiff purchased from the defendant a
carload of apples, said to contain 100 barrels "more or less." The
plaintiff knew that by the terms of the auction the sale was unwarranted. When delivered, thirty of the barrels contained nothing.
The plaintiff now sues in assumpsit to recover the purchase price
of the thirty barrels.
Klensin, for plaintiff.
Groff, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Kearney, J. The first question to'be determined in the case at
bar is the effect of the words "more or less" on the estimated
number of barrels said carload contained.
When a sale is in bulk, the quantity being estimated to be
"about a certain quantity, more or less", a delivery of the whole
is
good delivery, although the actual quantity is much less or much
greater than the quantity specified.
(35 Cyc. 206); McCrea v.
Longstreth, 17 Pa. 316. In the case of Ruth Hastings Glass Tube
Co. v. Slattery, 266 Pa. 288, it was held that where a sale is in
bulk and the vendor estimates the quantity in said bulk, the vendor
is obliged to give, and the vendee to take, whatever there is, even
if it is considerably more or less than stated.
In Lobenstein v. United States, 91 U. S. 324, it was held that
the estimate of the number which the bulk contained does not create
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an obligation to deliver that number and such number cannot be
understood to be guaranteed.
In the case at bar, the sale was in bulk, the plaintiff estimating
the number of barrels to be one hundred, "more or less," specifying
no specific number contained in the bulk. Therefore, the plaintiff
was obliged to give, and the vendee to take, whatever there was,
even though there was more or less than the estimated quantity.
The last question to be determined in this case is as to fraud.
Proof that the estimated quantity, when the sale was in bulk, is not
evidence'of fraud on the part of the vendor. McCrea v. Longstreth,
17 Pa. 316.
Defendant did not show that fraud was practiced by the plaintiff, owing to the fact that he set up only that the quantity fell
short from the estimated quantity.
Since the sale was in bulk, estimating only that the carload contained one hundred barrels of apples, and that the plaintiff failed to
prove that fraud was practiced by the defendant, we render judgment
in favor of the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
Where the quantity of goods sold is specified to be "more or
less", what variation in quantity will permit a set-off by the buyer?
It can be conceded that a slight variation, or even a large one, may
be held to have been contemplated by the contract. But the interpretation of such a phrase is varying according to the circumstances.
That such a phrase should not cover cases of intentional or fraudulent shortages needs no argument. Have we such circumstances as
disclose lack of good faith here? The fact that 30 empty barrels
were placed in the car in order to make up the 100 discloses a lack
of good faith and a fraudulent intent. Had the "empties" not been
sent, the case might have been different. No explanation is offered
for the insertion of the empty barrels. The cases cited all disclose
the qualification, annexed to the the phrase "more or less", that it does
not cover cases in which good faith is absent. We are constrained
to hold that notwithstanding the lack of warranties, there has been
a partial failure of consideration which is not covered by the phrase
"more or less". See Lewitus v. Fruit Corp., 219 N. Y. Supp. 51.
The judgment of the learned court below is reversed.
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ROLLINS v. JENNINGS
Sales-Buyer's Breach of Contract-Seller's Remedy
Sec. 64 (3) Sales Act of 191S, P. L. 543
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is assumpsit by the seller for refusal of the defendant to
accept deliveries of coal under a contract made between them. The
defendant admits the breach, but seeks to show in mitigation of the
damages, that the plaintiff, by virtue of the contracts he had made to
secure the coal to deliver to the defendant, would have had to pay
more than the market value for it. The court allowed recovery of
the difference between the contract price and the market value at the
time and place of delivery.
Brody, for Plaintiff.
Carrozza, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Cartwright, J. Defendant here admits the breach of the contract made between himself and the plaintiff but seeks to show in
mitigation of damages that the plaintiff, by virtue of the contracts
he had made with third persons to secure the coal to deliver to the
defendant, would have had to pay more than the market value for it.
This offer was denied by the lower court and the defendant has
appealed to this court.
This court is of the opinion that the ruling of the lower court
should be sustained. Section 64, paragraph 3 of the Sales Act of
1915, provides that, "Where there is an available market for the
goods in question, the measure of damages is, in the absence of
special circumstances showing proximate damage of a greater amount,
the difference between the contract price and the market or current
price at the time or times when the goods ought to have been accepted, or if no time was fixed for acceptance, then at the time of
the refusal to accept." This section of the Sales Act is in accord
with the lower court's decision in the case. The sentence, in the
above paragraph, relating to special circumstances, instead of operating to benefit the buyer, was placed there to benefit the seller. It
means that for the breach of such a contract as this, the seller may
recover the difference between the contract price and the market
price at the time and place of delivery, and further states that if
there are special circumstances showing proximate damage to a
greater amount, the seller may recover the greater amount.
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The court, in its search for authorities, has found nothing to
sustain the defendant's position, but has found many cases sustaining
the right of the plaintiff to recover the difference between the contract price and the market price at the time and place of delivery.
In Moore v. Green & Coate Street Passenger Ry. Co., 4 Philadelphia 261; Corser v. Hale, 149 Pa. 274; Guillon v. Earnshaw, 169 Pa.
463; Sharpsville Furnace Co. v. Snyder, 223 Pa. 372; Webb & Co. v.
Novelty Hosiery Co., 231 Pa. 297, it is held that, "The measure of
damages for a vendee's failure to receive and pay for goods contracted for, is the difference between the contract price and the
market value on the day of delivery."
In Jones v. Jennings, 168 Pa. 493, it is held that, "Where the
vendee refuses to accept the goods without sufficient cause the
title remains in the seller and the measure of damages for the refusal to accept is not the purchase price of the goods, but the difference between the price agreed upon (the contract price) and the
market value on the day appointed for delivery."
The casees cited supra hold absolutely that the decision of the
lower court must be sustained.
This rule of law is the only justifiable one because while it
may not do justice in a few cases, yet in most cases it has proved
to be the most satisfactory rule. Let us suppose for example that
the contract price in this case was $1.00 a ton and that the contract
called for 1,000 tons, and the market price at the time and place of
delivery was $1.10 a ton, and that the plaintiff to obtain the coal to
fulfill his contract with the defendant had to pay third persons $1.30
a ton. If this court allowed the defendant to set off the $300 the
plaintiff would lose on his contract, it would be virtually saying that
the plaintiff owed him $300 which he saved the plaintiff by breaking
the contract. This would be putting a premium on the breaking of
contracts such as this. Contracts for the sale of coal always set the
contract price lower than the market value, and the seller takes the
chance that he can get coal cheaper than the market value in order
to make money on his contract with the buyer. He can usually do
this by contracting with other parties at a lower price than he
sells to the buyer. But sometimes the price of coal soars beyond
expectations and then the plaintiff will lose as in this case, but here
the plaintiff is not trying to get out of a contract which he will lose
money on, but is willing and wants to deliver under it, although it
will mean a loss to him. Why should we allow the defendant to take
advantage of this as long as the plaintiff does not object? The plaintiff is perfectly willing to deliver at a loss under the contract, but he
is waiting for the price of coal to go down where he can make a
profit. The price of coal always soars in the winter time and drops
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in the summer, and what a seller loses in the winter, he may make
up in the summer months, and that is evidently what the plaintiff is
figuring on here. Then why should we allow the defendant to break
the contract and subject the plaintiff to a greater loss than he would
suffer were the contract not broken, and then whine that he has
saved the plaintiff money. The plaintiff has gone ahead and made
contracts with third persons on the assumption that the defendant
will not break the contract, and to allow the defendant to break the
contract, and allow him to reduce the damages as he wishes to, would
be subjecting the plaintiff to a greater loss than if the defendant took
the coal. It must be born in mind that the defendant is the guilty
party here, and the plaintiff the innocent one, and we are inclined to
hold to the rule, as enunciated in the cases cited, supra, and allow
the plaintiff to recover as much as he can, the difference between
the contract price and the market price at the time and place of
delivery.
See also the late case of Frank Pure Food Co., v. Dodson,
281 Pa. 125, holding the general rule enunciated in the above cases.
The lower court is affirmed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
There has been a refusal on the part of the buyer to accept
delivery of the goods sold. What damages may the seller recover?
Sec. 64, (3) of Sales Act of 1915, provides that where there is an
available market for the goods in question, the measure of damages
is, in the absence of special circumstances showing proximate damage
of a greater amount, the difference between the contract price and
the market price at the time when the goods ought to have been
accepted. It is patent that our Sales Act makes no allowance for
less damages for refusal to accept than the difference between
market value and the contract price. Nor should it. The seller is
liable on his contracts to buy and may be liable to damages for failure
'to accept. Just why the buyer should get the advantage of an unfavorable contract which the seller has made, where not contemplated
by the parties, is not apparent. Neither the Pennsylvania cases nor
the Sales Act make any provision for such. See U. S. v. Burton
Coal Co., 273 U. S. 337, 47 Sup. Ct. 351, for an analogous case.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.
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COMMONWEALTH v. WINFIELD

Practice-Murder Trial-Disagreement of Jurors-Erroneous
Questioning by Court
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Winfield was indicted and tried for the crime of murder. The
jury, having failed to agree after several hours of deliberation, were
recalled, and the judge inquired as to the numerical division of the
jury. The foreman informed him that the jury stood 11 to 1, but
did not indicate which number favored a conviction. The judge sent
the jury back for further deliberation and they convicted the defendant. Judgment on the verdict and defendant appeals.
Lichtenstein, for plaintiff.
Snoke, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Fry, J. In the beginning of the modern jury trial system, the
enforcement of the duty of jurors was sought thru harsh coercive
measures. Whatever views on the subject may have formerly obtained, it is now universally held to be erroneous for the courts by
words or acts to threaten or attempt to coerce the jurors for the
purpose of compelling them to render a verdict. Miller v. Miller,
187 Pa. 572.
It was held in People v. Sheldon, 156 N. Y. 268, that coercion
of the jury in order to secure a verdict is not permissable in any case,
and least of all in a capital case. An attempt to drive the members
of the jury into an agreement is beyond the power of the court and
an obvious effort to effect such a result demands a new trial.
The question in the case at bar is whether a jury can be considered to have been coerced by the court's inquiry as to how the
jury stands numerically, for the verdict does not depend upon the
majority, but upon the agreement of the entire jury. On the other,
hand, great harm may be done to the administration of justice by
such practices. Such inquiry cannot fail to influence the jury and
tend to put fear into the minority members by the veiled hint of
disapproval contained in the question. The court's inquiry can be
only the result of his impatience to dispose of the case. As suggested by counsel for the defendant, the disapproving atmosphere of
the court room may, upon the disclosure of the division, tend to
persuade the minority jurors to yield, perhaps against their convictions, to the majority. Particularly, in a criminal case, where a
man is being tried for his life, the least semblance of coercion upon
the jury should be avoided.
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In Burton v. U. S., 196 U. S. 283, the court asked the same
question as in the case at bar, and the same answer was given,
"eleven to one". Here the supreme court said, concerning such inquiry: "Such practice is not to be commended, because we cannot
see how it may be material for the court to understand the proportion of division of opinion among the jury". And also, "Cases
may be easily imagined where a practice of this kind might lead to
improper influences. We do not think that the proper administration
of law requires such knowledge or permits such a question on the
part of the presiding judge, and we must say in addition that, a
practice ought not to grow up of inquiring of a jury, when brought
into court because unable to agree, how the jury is divided".
In St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Bishard, 147 Fed. 496, the facts
are similar to those of the case at bar, except that the court delivered an additional charge. It is contended by the plaintiff that
the only error of the court was the additional charge by the court
to the jury. This is not so. The supreme court said, "While it is
within the discretion of a trial judge to recall a jury, after they
have been in deliberation for a considerable time without reaching
an agreement, for inquiry as to their difficulty and for further instruction if deemed advisable, it is not permissible to inquire of
them in what proportion they are divided, and any instruction in
respect to their duty to agree if possible should be carefully guarded,
so as not to unduly press such duty upon the minority".
The case of Girard Trust Co. v. Page, 282 Pa. 174, 127 At!. 458,
relied upon by the plaintiff, is not pertinent to the question at bar.
In that case, the information as to the numerical division of the
court was voluntarily given by the foreman of the jury to the court.
The plaintiff contends that the result is- the same whether inquired
for by the court or voluntarily given by the jury. We cannot agree
with the plaintiff. The jury may come to a decision in any manner
it thinks feasible among its members, so that if it thinks it to be
advisable to acquaint the court with its numerical division, it may
do so and there will be no error. But it is not necessary for the
court to know how the jury is divided and such inquiry can only
have effect to influence and coerce the jury.
In view of the foregoing rules and conclusions of law, we are
of the opinion that error was committed in the case at bar in the
inquiry of the foreman of the jury as to their division.
The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for a
new trial.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
As was pointed out in Miller v. Miller, 187 Pa. 572, at 587,
there has been no rule laid down by our courts determining just
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what a judge may authoritatively do to promote unanimity.

That

case and all of our cases have dealt with the question of what constitutes a proper charge when the jury is recalled. The opinion in
Girard Trust Co. v. Page, 282 Pa. 174, deals with the charge which
is proper. There the court knew of the numerical division of the
jury thru the voluntary statement of one of the jurors. It is no
authority on the issue here presented.
There having been no case in this state deciding whether the
inquiry of the judge as to the numerical division of the jury is
prejudicial error, we are free to decide it on principle. No one
familiar with the atmosphere of trial work could reasonably assert
that such procedure might not have a tendency to coerce the minority
juror or jurors. Brasefield v. U. S., 47 Sup. Ct. 135 (U. S. 1926),
in an opinion by Justice Stone holds that such a question, without
more, constitutes reversible error. We are inclined to adopt its
reasoning and conclusion.
The judgment of the learned court below is affirmed.

